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1. INTRODUCTION
The Canadian Bill of Exchange Act (the Act),' covering bills of
exchange (bills), cheques, and promissory notes (notes), is modeled
on its counterpart in England (the English Act).2 It was first adopted
in Canada in 1890 and, while it has been amended several times, has
never been substantially overhauled during the intervening 120
years.
One judge described the English Act as "the best drafted Act of
Parliament ever passed."4 Nevertheless, over the years, some
contentious issues have arisen in connection with its interpretation
while other provisions have become obsolete. Even so, considering
the overall operation of the Act, one can conclude that, as a
codification of the law of negotiable instruments, it has served its
purpose well.5 I do not propose repealing the Act or replacing it with
a new statute. Rather, the purpose of this paper is to identify points
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. Sarah
Templeton, Osgoode Hall L.S. (J.D. 2011) reviewed the manuscript and provided
invaluable assistance. Editorial assistance was also provided by Dennis Kao,
University of Toronto (J.D. 2009) and Adam Friedlan, University of Toronto
(J.D. 2012). The author assumes responsibility for any errors or oversights.
1. Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4 (unless indicated otherwise, all
statutory references below are to the Act).
2. Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (U.K.), 45 & 46 Vict., c. 61.
3. For its legislative history, see B. Crawford, The Law of Banking and Payment in
Canada, vol. 3 (Aurora, Ontario, Canada Law Book) (looseleaf), at § 20:30.10.
4. Bank Polski v. Mulder and Co., [1942] 1 K.B. 497, [1942] 1 All E.R. 396 (C.A.), at
p. 500, MacKinnon L.J.
5. To the same effect, see my earlier article, B. Geva, "Reflections on the Need to
Revise the Bills of Exchange Act - Some Doctrinal Aspects" (1982), 6 C.B.L.J.
269. To a large extent, this paper is a follow-up to that article.
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to be addressed in specific amendments to the existing Act and
designed to clarify and improve the law of negotiable instruments.
This approach will retain the Act's connection with English law,
including the extensive jurisprudence that has evolved over the years
throughout the Commonwealth and in other countries with similar
legislation. 6
It should be pointed out that the Act has not functioned as a
codification of the law of payment systems or funds transfers. Thus,
while it provides for cheques as instruments, it is not a
comprehensive code covering cheque collection; nor does it cover
other methods for the transfer of funds from one bank account to
another. The proposed amendments are not intended to be a
substitute for the badly needed and long overdue codification of a
more general funds transfer law.
The discussion that follows sets out modest proposals, consistent
with the present structure and language of the Act, for the
improvement of the law of negotiable instruments. Proposals take
into account the approach of the South African Bills of Exchange
Amendment Act, 2000.' They are also influenced by the substantive
law in the United States.8 However, they primarily draw on my own
reflections that have evolved in more than 30 years of research,
teaching, and consulting in Canada and elsewhere. Limited space
precludes me from engaging in an exhaustive discussion of possible
amendments to the Act. Topics excluded altogether are the conflict
of laws provisions, (addressed in ss. 159 to 163), the drawee bank's
right to recover a mistaken cheque payment, and the consequential
changes required to complement the substantive changes outlined
6. An overview of the level of adherence by these jurisdictions is provided in P.
Ellinger, "Negotiable Instruments," chap. 4 in J.S. Ziegel, chief ed., Commercial
Transactions and Institutions, vol. IX of U. Drobnig and K. Zweigert, responsible
eds., International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Tilbingen, J.C.B. Mohr,
2000), at pp. 46-51. Countries are divided into those with minor and major
variations. Canada is classified as a jurisdiction with major deviations. Greater
deviations appear in statutes such as that of South Africa and India (discussed
ibid., at pp. 51-54). This is even more true for the United States (discussed ibid., at
pp. 54-56) which is, in my view, sui generis because its legislation, the Uniform
Commercial Code (ucc), art. 3 (1990, as amended 2002) has departed altogether
from the English model, not only in matters of substance, but also in structure,
style and language.
7. Act No. 56 of 2000, to amend the Bills of Exchange Act, Act 34 of 1964, as am.
(S.A. Amendment Act). For an extensive review of the South African
amendments see L. Gering and D. Tobias, Commentary on the Bills of Exchange
Amendment Act 2000 (Lansdowne, South Africa, Juta Law, 2001).
8. As pointed in footnote 6, supra, ucc art. 3 derived its basic concepts, albeit
indirectly, from the English Act. It is only natural then that ucc art. 3 will be a
source of inspiration for proposals to reform the Act in Canada.
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below.9 I have not attempted to provide precise language for the
proposed amendments. The proposed new sections appear in the
area closest to their subject-matter.
II. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
1. Outright Deletions With No Replacements
Several provisions are to be deleted outright as they involve
practices that are obsolete or no longer in use:
1. Sections 13 to 15 dealing with the marking of bills or notes,
the consideration for which consists of the purchase price of
a patent right so as to make their transferee subject to
equities. Nowadays, there is no reason to distinguish such
transactions from ordinary business transactions so as to
deny the transferees the benefits that would accrue to
holders in due course;' 0
2. Section 32 dealing with the referee in case of need. The
practice is "archaic" and out of use if not altogether
''extinct";
3. Section 41 dealing with days of grace for bills not payable
on demand;' 2
4. Sections 146 to 154 dealing with acceptance and payment
for honour. These provisions too are obsolete;13 and
5. Sections 168 to 175 dealing with crossed cheques because
crossed cheques are not used in Canada.14
9. On the former point (the drawee bank's right to recover on cheques paid by
mistake of fact), see Geva, supra, footnote 5, at pp. 302-313.
10. See Crawford, supra, footnote 3, vol. 3 at § 21:40.110.
I1. N. Elliott, J. Odgers and J.M. Phillips, Byles on Bills of Exchange and Cheques,
28th ed. (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) (Byles), at p. Ill (regarding s. 15 of
the English Act corresponding to s. 32 of the Act). See also Crawford, supra,
footnote 3, vol. 3 at § 30:10 (by reference to p. 30:20.10). Reference in case of need
is a practice under which the drawer and any endorser may insert on the bill the
name of a person to whom the holder may resort in case of dishonour.
12. "No days of grace are provided for in the ucc in the United States or in the U.K.
Bills of Exchange Act or in the Geneva Convention . See Crawford, supra,
footnote 3, vol. 3, at § 22:50.40.
13. Ibid., at § 30:10 (by reference to p. 30:20.20 and .30). The provisions refer to the
power to honour the bill by a person who is not a party to it.
14. Ibid., at § 34:80.10.
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2. Amendment to Section 2:
Expanding the Definition of "Issue"
With respect to an instrument issued to order, the definition of
"issue"should be expanded to include the first delivery, not only to
the "holder," namely the payee or endorsee in possession of the
instrument (as defined in s. 2), but to any person entitled to
possession of the instrument. This amendment is designed to
recognize the possibility of a bank draft payable to a payee and
issued to a remitter, who is then expected to deliver it to the payee for
value as, for example, for the payment of goods sold by the payee to
the remitter. While in possession, the remitter is a non-holder in
lawful possession whose rights will be governed by proposed new s.
73.1 (item 20, below). Under proposed new s. 73.1(f), the remitter's
delivery for value to the payee will constitute "negotiation" of the
instrument. This will then accord the payee holder in due course
status and enable the payee to hold the instrument free from defences
available to the issuing banker against the remitter/customer. At
present, both aspects of such instruments- the rights of the remitter
as well as the defence-free position of the payee who takes the
instrument in good faith and for value - are confused and the law is
in an unsatisfactory state.
3. Amendments to Sections 16 and 176:
Unconditional Order or Promise
It is a basic tenet of negotiable instruments governed by the Act
that the order or promise to pay must be unconditional.
Amendments to the definitions of a "bill of exchange" and
"promissory note" should clarify that the precluded condition is
external to the instrument. Thus, an instrument payable by a certain
date or subject to a countersignature is nevertheless a bill (if it is an
order) or a note (if it is a promise), since compliance with the
condition can be ascertained by reference to the mere appearance of
the instrument. This will remove any doubt as to the application of
the Act to the traveller's cheque.
4. Amendment to Section 25:
Bill Drawn on the Drawer
Section 25 currently provides that "where in a bill drawer and
drawee are the same person ... the holder may treat the instrument,
at his option, either as a bill or as a note." The recommended
2011] 29
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amendment is intended to clarify that such an instrument is to be
governed by the BEA in any event, regardless of the holder's choice.15
5. Amendment to Section 20(3):
Bill Payable to Bearer
This amendment is intended to clarify that a bill which is payable
to "cash," "cash or order" or any other impersonal payee is to be
payable to bearer.
6. Amendment to Section 20(5): Fictitious Payee
A new paragraph should be added to state that a bill is deemed
payable to a fictitious or non-existing person when the person
identified as payee is not intended to have any interest in the bill by:
(a) a person who fraudulently signs the bill;
(b) an employee or agent, entrusted with responsibility with respect to
bills issued by the employer or principal of the employee or agent,
who fraudulently supplies the name or identification of the payee to
an authorized signer on behalf of the employer or principal, who
signs it on the basis of the name or identification so supplied (the so-
called "payroll padding" practice); or
(c) a person who fraudulently supplies the name or identification of the
payee to be signed by automated means, and the bill is so signed.
Also to be considered for inclusion is the case of an impostor
impersonating the payee or a person authorized to act for the payee.
This will cover situations where, by use of the mails or otherwise, the
impostor induces the drawer to issue the bill to the impostor or to a
person acting in concert with him.16
Current jurisprudence on s. 20(5) is confusing and unsatisfactory.
For instance, it has been held that while the existence of a payee is
objectively determined, "fictitiousness"results from the intention of
the creator of the instrument. It was accordingly held that the section
applies where a fraudulent employee supplies the signer of a payroll
cheque with the name of a dead person, with the intent of himself
collecting on the cheque. When the fraudulent employee cashes the
cheque, the loss falls on the employer. However, where the
fraudulent employee provided the payroll signing officer with the
name of a former employee, i.e., a real person in existence, the latter
was not "fictitious" from the point of view of the signing officer.
15. See, e.g., Law Society of Alberta v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1989),
71 Alta. L.R. (2d) 102, 101 A.R. 374 (Q.B.), at pp. 127-128 (Alta L.R.).
16. This follows in the footsteps of ucc § 3-404(a).
[Vol. 50
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Therefore, the section did not apply and the employer was able to
avoid the loss.' 7 It was subsequently held that it is only the intention
of a director with signing authority that can determine whether the
payee was fictitious.' 8 An amendment is necessary to reverse this
case law and to allocate the loss incurred by internal fraud where it
belongs, namely, the company within which the fraud was
perpetrated. The amendment is particularly intended to cover
cases of payroll padding, i.e., where the drawer's agent or employee
furnishes the signing officer with the payee's name and with the
intention of the agent or employee to collect on the cheque.
7. Amendment to Section 27(1)(c): Bill Payable in Instalments
This amendment is intended to clarify that an instalment bill is
to be payable in a sum certain not only when acceleration is upon
default in one instalment. Rather, an instalment bill should also be
payable in a sum certain when acceleration is pursuant to a valid
acceleration clause on the bill or in the agreement for which it was
taken and which is identified on the bill. An agreement providing
for the pledge of collateral security for the engagement on the bill
is such an agreement. The current provision gives effect to an
acceleration clause only on the basis of default in payment and
only on the instrument.' 9 This is too narrow.
8. Addition to Section 27(1): Floating Rate Instruments
An amendment is required to accommodate instruments on
which the interest payable is stated to be floating as determined by
some index. The sum payable on such an instrument cannot be
ascertained from the face of the instrument. Case law supports this
practice;20 however, s. 27(1)(d) is limited to an instrument payable
17. See Royal Bank of Canada v. Concrete Colum Clamps (1961) Ltd. (1976), 74
D.L.R. (3d) 26, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 456.
18. See Boma Manufacturing Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1996),
140 D.L.R. (4th) 463, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 727, which I discussed at length in B. Geva,
"Conversion of Unissued Cheques and the Fictitious or Non-Existing Payee -
Boma v. cmc" (1997), 28 C.B.L.J. 177.
19. See, e.g., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Morgan, [1993]7 W.W.R. 171,
II Alta. L.R. (3d) 90 (Q.B.).
20. See, e.g., New Fort Financial Services Ltd. v. 85190 Holdings Ltd. (1984), 55 A.R.
157 (Q.B.); Royal Bank of Canada v. Stonehocker (1985), 61 B.C.L.R. 265 (C.A.),
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1985] 1 S.C.R. xiii; National Bank of Canada v.
Intracom Investments Ltd. (1985), 165 A.P.R. 351, 64 N.B.R. (2d) 351 (Q.B.),
vard with respect to calculation of compound interest only [1986] N.B.J. No. 79,
72 N.B.R. (2d) 34 (C.A.); and Alberta (Treasury Branches) v. Smith (1989), 45
B.L.R. 122, 67 Alta. L.R. (2d) 357 (Q.B.).
2011] 31
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"according to an indicated rate of exchange or a rate of exchange to
be ascertained as directed by the bill" and does not cover a rate of
interest to be ascertained as directed by the bill.
9. Amendment to Sections 31(1) and 39:
Protection Against Unauthorized Completion or Issue
At present, the protection of one who takes an instrument after it
has been completed without authority is limited in three ways. First,
he21 must be a holder in due course and cannot be a bonafide payee.
Second, the signer of the blank form must have delivered the
instrument; even a holder in due course will not be protected in cases
where the signer has been dispossessed. Third, initial delivery of the
incomplete instrument must have been made by the signer "in order
that [the signed blank paper] may be converted into a bill"; delivery
for safekeeping will not protect the innocent holder even where he is
a holder in due course.2
An amendment ought to eliminate all these limitations and
allocate the loss of signing an incomplete instrument form to the
signer. Indeed, by itself, signing a blank form instrument exposes the
signer to a risk, which the signer ought to bear.
It has also been held in Canada that an action by a holder in due
course can successfully be met by a defence of lack of issue of a
complete instrument.2 3 This result is contrary to principle 24 and
ought to be rectified by a proper statutory amendment.
10. Amendment to Section 48:
Ratification of Forged Signature
Section 48(2) precludes "the ratification of an unauthorized
signature . . . amounting to forgery." As a matter of private law,
21. Following the language of the Act, I use "he" to denote he, she or it, and "his/
him" by reference to her, it or its. Certainly, I will not object to a statutory
amendment adopting a gender neutral language throughout the Act.
22. The leading case is Smith v. Prosser, [19071 2 K.B. 735, 23 T.L.R. 597 (C.A.).
23. National Bank of Canada v. Tardivel Associates (1993), 15 O.R. (3d) 188, 44
A.C.W.S. (3d) 1191 (Gen. Div.), affd 109 D.L.R. (4th) 126, 17 O.R. (3d) 61 (Gen.
Div. (Div. Ct.)). This is so notwithstanding the "valid delivery" conclusive
presumption in s. 39(2). Briefly stated, the court reasoned that an undelivered bill
is not a "bill" and hence, the provision does not apply.
24. See B. Crawford, "Is This A Cheque I See Before Me?: National Bank v. Tardivel
and The Scope Of The Defence Of Non-Delivery" (1994), 24 C.B.L.J. 1, and B.
Geva, "Negotiable Instruments and Banking: Review of Some Recent Canadian
Case Law" (1994), 9 B.F.L.R. 197, at pp. 203-205.
[Vol. 50
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there is no compelling reason for this result and it is proposed that
the provision be repealed.
11. New Section 49.1: Allocation of Forgery Losses
Allocation of forgery losses on the basis of fault contributing to
the loss is likely to reduce forgery losses. However, Canada has
followed English law 25 in giving fault no explicit role in the
allocation of forgery losses. Thus, Canadian case law has declined to
impose a duty of care on a customer towards the drawee bank to
prevent and detect forgery. 26 In practice, banks have overcome this
by providing for such duties in their standard form customer
contracts. This, however, has resulted in unnecessarily long account
agreements that may contain controversial terms. 27 Moreover, lack
of privity of contract usually precludes a collecting bank (typically
the taker from a forged endorsement) from being protected against a
negligent drawer.28
Thus, in Anglo-American legal systems, the general rule is that a
forged endorsement is wholly inoperative and may not pass title even
to a bonafide purchaser. This is expressed in Canada in s. 48 of the
Act. This rule, which allocates forged endorsement losses to the
transferee from the forger, goes back to Mead v. Young.2 9 There,
25. See, e.g., London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan, [1918 1 A.C. 777, 34 T.L.R. 509
(H.L.), at p. 795 (A.C.), Lord Finlay L.C., holding that for the customer to
become liable to the drawee bank his "negligence must be in the transaction itself,
that is, in the manner in which the cheque is drawn."
26. The leading case is Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1987), 40
D.L.R. (4th) 385, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 711, which followed Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd.
v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd., [1985] 3 W.L.R. 317, [19841 1 Lloyd's Rep. 555
(C.A.), revg [19861 1 A.C. 80, [1985] 2 All E.R. 947 (P.C.).
27. See generally K.W. Perrett, "Account Verification Clauses: Should Bank
Customers be Forced to Mind Their Own Business?" (1999), 14 B.F.L.R. 245.
A most recent case in which the contract language was found to be inadequate to
protect the bank is S.N.S. Industrial Products Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (2010),
321 D.L.R. (4th) 531, 2010 ONCA 500.
28. For an attempt to overcome this hurdle, see Royal Bank of Canada v. Socidtd
Gin&ale (Canada) (2007), 31 B.L.R. (4th) 63, 154 A.C.W.S. (3d) 72 (Ont. C.A.),
supp. reasons 31 B.L.R. (4th) 83, 2007 ONCA 302, leave to appeal to S.CC.
refused [2007] 3 S.C.R. xv, 376 N.R. 400n, declining to summarily dismiss the
collecting bank's action against drawers for negligence, unjust enrichment, and
money had and received.
29. (1790), 4 T.R. 28, 100 E.R. 876 (K.B.). Mead v. Young involved misdirection by
the mail, to a person other than the designated payee, of a bill payable to order;
both the drawer and the designated payee were innocent. Buller J. found the
drawer not to be negligent. Cheques paid by and to large business entities and
organizations were not contemplated when the rule was pronounced, so that
policy considerations involving loss caused by the misuse of such cheques were
not taken into account at that time. In the present cheque collection environment,
34 Canadian Business Law Journal
Buller J. rationalized the rule on a loss-reduction ground, stating
that the taker from the forger is in a better position to take necessary
precautions than the drawer who "might have no means of
discovering the person who committed the forgery."30
The rule in s. 48 concerning the ineffectiveness of forgery is not
stated in absolute terms; rather, under s. 48(1), a forged or
unauthorized signature "is wholly inoperative ... unless the party
against whom [the instrument) is sought to retain or enforce
payment is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of
authority." As indicated, Mead v. Young attributed the
ineffectiveness of a forged endorsement to the loss-reduction
policy. Hence, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the loss-
reduction policy also ought to determine the scope of the estoppel
exception, so as to apply it to the case of a negligent drawer who
purports to rely on the forgery as against the collecting bank.
There has been no need for this interpretation in England because
the English Act contains specific statutory provisions protecting
both drawee and collecting banks dealing in good faith and without
negligence in circumstances where a cheque bears a forged
endorsement.31 Other than for crossed cheques 32 (which are not
used in Canada), such provisions are not included in the Canadian
Act. In this respect, the Canadian statutory scheme is similar to the
American approach.34 However, in the United States, general duties
of care to prevent and detect forgery are addressed in §§ 3-406 and 4-
406 of the Uniform Commercial Code (ucc).
For their part, Canadian courts have relied on the plain language
of s. 48 and the interpretation of the "estoppel" clause in its English
counterparts, neither of which has allowed for the recognition and
evolution of duties of care in the allocation of forgery losses. It is
proposed that this restriction be eliminated by statute.
the typical taker from the forger is the collecting bank that may not be in a
position to detect fraud against the drawer or drawee.
30. Ibid., at p. 32 (T.R.), at p. 878 (E.R.).
31. These provisions are s. 60, included in the English Act from its inception (dealing
with the drawee bank), and s. 4 of the Cheques Act, 1957 (U.K.), c. 36 (dealing
with the collecting bank. Until 1957, protection for a collecting bank was limited
in England under s. 82 of the English Act to crossed cheques). Thus, in England,
there has been no pressing need to deal with the existence of such a duty of care.
32. See the Act, supra, footnote 1, at ss. 171 and 172.
33. See, supra, recommendation 5 in the part of this paper entitled "l. Outright
Deletions with No Replacements."
34. However, the United States has not included any provision as to crossed cheques.
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12. Replacement of Section 50: Signature by Procuration
The provision dealing with signature by procuration should be
repealed. The text is outdated and confusing; it is not even entirely
clear what constitutes "a signature by procuration." I propose
instead that the Act adopt the general principles of agency law as an
introduction to s. 5 1(1). The replacing provision should state that a
person may sign a bill on behalf of a principal or a represented
person, in which case, where the signer was authorized to sign on
behalf of the principal or represented person, and subject to s. 51, the
signer is exempted from personal liability. Rather, it is the principal
or represented person who should be bound by the signature and
who should be liable on the bill.
13. Amendment to Section 51(1)
Section 5 1(1), dealing with signing in a representative capacity, is
incomplete and has given rise to confusing case law.35 1 propose to
add the following amendments: a signer who signs on a bill on which
another name appears is personally liable to a holder without
knowledge of the signer's representative character. Stated otherwise,
a signature on a bill without an indication of a representative
capacity, coupled with the identification of the principal, is to result
in the personal liability by the signer. An exception could be made to
cover the case of a signer who signs his name without indicating his
representative status on a standard form-bill indicating the name of
another person and an account of that other person from which the
drawee is to obtain reimbursement. As well, I propose to add that a
signer, who has no authority to sign for or on behalf of the person
indicated as principal, or in a representative character, shall be
personally liable on the bill.
In the case of reasonable ambiguity as to whether a signature is in
a representative capacity, it ought to be provided that the signer is
personally liable to a holder in due course who took the bill without
notice that the signer was not intended to be personally liable on the
bill. As against any other holder, the signer should also be personally
liable, unless the signer, who had authority to sign for or on behalf of
the person indicated as principal, or in a representative character,
proves that the original parties did not intend him to be liable on the
bill.
35. See, e.g., Aliprint Co. v. Erwin (1982), 136 D.L.R. (3d) 587, 38 O.R. (2d) 13(C.A.).
352011]
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14. Amendment to Section 52(1): Taking for Value
"Value" is partially defined in ss. 2 and 52(1) to cover both a mere
promise and an executory consideration. This works well so far as
the creation of an obligation, or liability, on a bill (or note) is
concerned. However, it does not work well in connection with the
transfer, or the taking for value requirement, for the purpose of
becoming holder in due course under s. 55(1)(b). Under that section,
the better view is that taking for value requires the value or
consideration to be executed.36 Thus, a holder, to whom an
instrument was transferred for value consisting of a promise of
performance or payment by him, ought to be excused from the
performance of the promise if he becomes aware of a defect in the
title of his transferor prior to performance; if that holder goes ahead
and performs with full knowledge of the defect, he ought to lose his
holder-in-due-course status. An amendment is thus required to
clarify that taking for value is taking to the extent of the performance
of the promise.
15. Replacement of Section 53(1): Holder for Value
Section 53(1) is notoriously enigmatic. It provides that where
value has been given for a bill the holder is deemed to be a holder for
value, but neither the definition nor the rights of "holder for value"
are clearly set out. Nor is it clear why and for what purposes the
provision is needed. It is proposed that the provision be replaced by a
statement of the existing implicit principle under the Act that
"value," as defined in s. 2 in conjunction with s. 52(1), is required to
support an obligation on a bill (or note), except that absence of
consideration is not a defence against a holder in due course.3 7
16. Amendment to Section 54(2):
To Whom is the Accommodation Party Liable?
As explained, "holder for value" has an unclear and confusing
status and should thus be eliminated. Accordingly, it should be
enough to provide that the accommodation party is liable on the bill
on his accommodation party's signature, and not only "to a holder
for value" as currently stated.
36. This point is noted by J.S. Ziegel in "Royal Bank of Canada v. Dawson Motors
(Guelph) Ltd.: A Postscript" (1981-82), 6 C.B.L.J. 507, at pp. 508-509.
37. See discussion in B. Geva, "Absence of Consideration in the Law of Bills and
Notes" (1980), 39 Cambridge L.J. 360.
[Vol. 50
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17. New Subsection 55(1.1) and Amendment to Section 57:
Protection of Remote Party-Payee
So far as the acceptor is concerned, the payee is a remote party.
Nevertheless, under the orthodox position, the payee cannot be a
holder in due course because he does not take the bill by
negotiation.3 8 There is no satisfactory explanation for the payee's
defence-free position towards the acceptor. 39 It is thus proposed that
the Act provide that, as towards the acceptor, a payee to whom the
drawer issued the bill should have rights of a holder in due course
where the payee has taken the bill complete and regular on its face,
the payee became the holder before the instrument was overdue, the
payee took the instrument in good faith and for value, and the payee
had no notice of any defence of the acceptor against the drawer.
As well, a payee should benefit from a presumption of having the
rights of a holder in due course under s. 57(2),40 even when he does
not take the bill by "negotiation." 4 1 This will oblige him to repel the
attack on the presumption on the same footing as an endorsee. 42 For
example, if a third-party's fraud in the issue of the bill is proven, in
order to recover, the payee ought to be required (contrary to Talbot
v. Van Boris)43 to prove that, subsequent to the issue of the bill, value
has been given for it in good faith.
18. Amendment to Section 55(2): Defective Title
"Defective title" should include (i) the failure to provide in full or
in part the value for the bill or its issue, and (ii) the availability to any
38. See Jones (R. E.) Ltd. v. Waring and Gillow Ltd., [1926] I A.C. 670, 41 T.L.R.
332 (H.L.).
39. See Byles, supra, footnote 11, at pp. 235-238.
40. For the wording of the suggested amendment to s. 58, cf B. Geva, "Defences on
Cheque Certification: Esses v. Friedberg" (2009), 24 B.F.L.R. 359, where I argue
that court could so interpret s. 57(2) as it is worded now.
41. When a payee takes a bill by "negotiation," as when he takes it from a
remitter, he could become a holder in due course anyway under the proposed
new s. 73.1(0.
42. Presently, s. 57(2) reads (2) Every holder of a bill is, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, deemed to be a holder in due course, but if, in an action on a bill, it
is admitted or proved that the acceptance, issue or subsequent negotiation of the
bill is affected with fraud, duress or force and fear, or illegality, the burden of
proof that he is the holder in due course is on him, unless and until he proves
that, subsequent to the alleged fraud or illegality, value has in good faith been
given for the bill by some other holder in due course.
43. Talbot v. Von Boris, [1911] I K.B. 854 (C.A.). The case held that the provision
cannot benefit the payee to whom the bill was originally issued. For a critical
analysis, see Geva, supra, footnote 40, at pp. 362-364, and 368-371.
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person of an adverse claim to the bill. The current definition of
"defective title" in s. 55(2) is stated to be non-exhaustive. The term
itself originated as "equities affecting the bill" so as to be
distinguished from "equities affecting the parties."44 "Defect of
title" or "equities affecting the bill" ought to encompass both (i) a
prior party's "equities of liability" or contract defences and (ii) a
third party's "equities of ownership" or adverse claims to the
instrument.4 5
An adverse claim of ownership need not be that of a prior party
liable on the bill. For example, such is the claim of a dispossessed
holder of an instrument payable to bearer, who will successfully
assert his claim except against a holder in due course.
The proposed amendment will necessitate the addition of a new
definition to s. 2 stating that "adverse claim" means a claim of a
property or possessory right in the bill or note or its proceeds,
including a claim to rescind a negotiation and to recover the bill or
note or its proceeds.
19. Amendment to Add a New Paragraph to Section 73:
Rights of Holder Not in Due Course
A new provision should be added to state that a holder not in due
course acquires such title as his transferor has in the bill, so that,
except when he has rights of a holder in due course under s. 73(b), he
holds the bill subject to any defect of title affecting the bill or
attaching thereto, as well as to mere personal defences available to
him against his own immediate prior party.
The Act provides in s. 73(b) for the holder in due course's
freedom from "any defect of title . . . as well as from mere personal
defences." It is generally accepted that a holder not in due course
holds the bill subject to any defect of title but only to the mere
personal defences available to his immediate party.4 6 For "defect of
title", see s. 55(2) as proposed to be revised above. A new definition
should be added to define "mere personal defence" to mean the set-
off by way of defence to an action on a bill or note of a debt or any
other liquidated sum of money owed to the defendant, other than
44. See Alcock v. Smith, [1892] 1 Ch. 238 at p. 263, 8 T.L.R. 222 (C.A.).
45. See generally Z. Chafee, "Rights in Overdue Paper" (1917-18), 31 Hary. L. Rev.
1104, at p. 1109.
46. See ss. 69(1) and 71 and discussion in B. Geva, Financing Consumer Sales and
Product Defences in Canada and the United States (Toronto, Carswell, 1984), pp.
125-131.
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on the basis of any defect to the plaintiff's title in the bill or note.4 7 A
defence based on the failure to provide in full or in part the value for
the bill or its issue is not a mere personal defence.
This new definition for "mere personal defence" is declaratory.
Equally declaratory is the proposed statement under which a holder
not in due course is subject to any defect of title, as well as to mere
personal defences available to his immediate party. At the same
time, the proposed revision to s. 55(2) expanded the definition of
"defect of title" to include the "failure to provide in full or in part
the value for the bill or its issue." Under the new paragraph to s. 73
here proposed, "failure to provide in full or in part the value for the
bill or its issue," being a defect of title under the proposed revision to
s. 55(2), will thus be available against any holder not in due course.
This will be a desirable modification; at present, the prevailing view
is that the failure of consideration in an unascertained amount (e.g.,
breach of contract resulting in unliquidated damages) is not
available against a holder not in due course, even when he is an
immediate party. A leading case is James Lamont & Co. Ltd. v.
Hyland Ltd.,4 8 where the Court of Appeal did not allow an
immediate party (a buyer of services who was the acceptor of a bill)
to set up a defence or bring a counterclaim or apply for a stay of
execution, based on alleged unliquidated damages due from the
plaintiff (payee-seller of the services), arising from the latter's
breach of the contract for which the bill was given. 4 9 This osition is
specifically rejected in the United States b ucc art. 3, which I
recommend should be followed in Canada.
20. New Section 73.1: Rights of Non-Holder
in Lawful Possession
A new provision should be added to cover the rights of a non-
holder in lawful possession in his own right of a bill payable to
order 52 as follows:
47. Ibid., at pp. 131-137.
48. [1950] 1 K.B. 585, [1950] 1 All E.R. 929.
49. Cf. Iraco v. Staiman Steel (1987), 62 O.R. (2d) 129, 45 D.L.R. (4th) 158 (C.A.),
where the court allowed defendant to pay the amount of the instrument into
court pending his counterclaim against an out-of-country plaintiff-holder
allegedly in breach of the contract that gave rise to the instrument.
50. See ucc, § 3-305(a)(2) and (3).
51. For an extensive analysis see B. Geva, "Equities as to Liability on Bills and
Notes: Rights of a Holder Not in Due Course" (1980-81), 5 C.B.L.J. 53, arguing
for this result as a matter of common law.
52. With respect to a bill payable to bearer, the one in possession is, by definition, a
"holder." See the definition of "bearer" in s. 2.
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(a) Where he is a transferee he acquires such title and rights as the
transferor had in the bill;
(b) Where he is a transferee for value he also has the right to have the
endorsement of the transferor;
(c) He may sue parties liable on the bill in his own name, in which case:
(i) he must prove lawful possession in his own right;
(ii) he must comply with all duties and obligations under the Act as
if he is a holder; and
(iii) the party liable is entitled raise to all defences available to him as
if the action was brought by a holder other than a holder in due
course.
(d) He may give discharge on the bill, and payment to him is deemed to
be payment in due course;
(e) He may transfer lawful possession and dispose of all other rights and
title to a transferee;
(f) Notwithstanding section 59(3), he may negotiate the bill by
delivering it to the payee or endorsee;
(g) He may endorse and incur endorser's liability to any subsequent
holder, but as against a party who became liable on the bill prior to
the endorsement of the non-holder in lawful possession in his own
right, any subsequent person in possession, whether or not he is an
endorsee, may be a non-holder in lawful possession in his own right,
but not a holder;
(h) He may exercise the option of a holder under section 25 (regarding a
bill drawn on the drawer).
Some examples of a non-holder in lawful possession in his own
right are the remitter of a bill payable to his creditor, a transferee of
an unendorsed instrument payable to order (who took it either for
value or by way of gift), a drawer who pays a bill payable to a third
party, or a trustee in bankruptcy or executor in possession of a bill
payable to the bankrupt or deceased. The Act deals only with two of
these cases. First, s. 60(1) covers a transferee for value of an
unendorsed instrument. Second, s. 139 applies to a drawer who pays
a bill payable to a third party. It is proposed to deal with the issue in a
more comprehensive and exhaustive way, so as to codify and apply a
principle which goes back to pre-English Act cases. 53
In the proposed new provision, a non-holder in lawful possession
in his own right is treated like a holder not in due course, though this
is subject to a few exceptions that make his position less desirable.
First, he does not benefit from the presumptions that inure to the
benefit of a holder;54 he is thus required to prove his lawful
53. See, e.g., Mason v. Morgan (1834), 2 Ad. & E. 30, Ill E.R. 12 (K.B.); and Stone v.
Rawlinson (1745), Willes 559, 125 E.R. 1320.
54. Per s. 57, these presumptions concern becoming a party for value and holding in
due course.
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possession in order to benefit from his status. Second, under
proposed paragraph (g), while he may endorse and incur endorser's
liability, subsequent transferees remain non-holder owners and not
holders towards parties prior to him.55
Proposed paragraph (g) is intended to clarify the existing law.
This clarification can be read into the existing provisions, though not
without difficulties. Thus, under s. 130, the signature of the non-
holder in lawful possession is that of an "endorser." He therefore has
the power to transfer the bill by negotiation to someone who will be a
"holder" towards himself but not towards prior parties with respect
to whom there is no uninterrupted chain of negotiations.
Per the proposed new s. 73.1(f), a remitter may confer on the
payee a holder in due course status, since the taking of the
instrument from the remitter amounts to "negotiation." This
rectifies the current anomalous situation under which the payee's
freedom from the defences of the issuer of a bank cheque against the
remitter was held to exist on the basis of (to say the least) dubious
theories.56
The proposed s. 73.1(h) would give the non-holder in lawful
possession the holder's options in relation to the nature of an
instrument drawn on the drawer as well as in relation to the nature of
an unexplained signature.
21. Deletion from Section 130: Endorser's
Liability Presumption
Section 130 provides in part that "when a person signs a bill
otherwise than as a drawer or acceptor, he thereby incurs the
liabilities of an endorser to a holder in due course and is subject to all
the provisions of this Act respecting endorsers." Reference to an
endorser's liability "to a holder in due course" is redundant and thus
should be omitted.
55. Thus, where A issues a bill payable to B who negotiates it to C who transfer it by
delivery to D who endorses it to E, E (and any subsequent endorsee) may sue D
as a holder but may sue A and B only on the basis of lawful possession of a non-
holder.
56. See, e.g., Yan v. Post Office Bank, [1994] 1 N.Z.L.R. 154 (C.A.), discussed by B.
Geva, "The Issuer's Defences Against the Payee of a Bank Draft - Addendum
to 'The Autonomy of the Banker's Obligation on Bank Drafts and Certified
Cheques' (1994), 73 Can. Bar Rev. 280.
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22. New Section 130.1: Giver of an Aval
Liability of a person who gives an aval to secure or guarantee the
liability of a party on a bill is not provided by the Act. This omission
led to a complex practice in England;5 7 however the omission was
cured in Canada by a "creative" interpretation of s. 130, which
contains additional language that does not appear in its English
counterpart covering the stranger's liability. 59 However, it is
suggested here that a comprehensive legislative solution, possibly
modeled on the South African amendment,60 will dispel any possible
remaining doubts and put the matter on firmer grounds.
23. Replacement of Section 144(1): Material Alteration
Under s. 144(1), "where a bill or an acceptance is materially
altered without the assent of all parties liable on the bill, the bill is
voided, except as against a party who has himself made, authorized
or assented to the alteration and subsequent endorsers."61
The provision is deficient in two principal respects; both should be
rectified by amendment. First, it is better to speak of the materially
altered bill being discharged rather than being voided. Second, it is
not justified to release those who became liable prior to the material
alteration from their original liability where the material alteration
was not fraudulently made, authorized or assented to by the holder.
Case law may have confirmed this result by excluding accidental
57. See, e.g., MacDonald (Gerald) & Co. v. Nash, [ 1924] 1 A.C. 625, 40 T.L.R. 530
(H.L.). See also G. & H. Montage GMBh v. Irvani, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 667, [1990] 2
All E.R. 225 (C.A.), at pp. 671-674 (W.L.R.), leave to appeal to H.L. refused
[19901 1 W.L.R. 692c, for a review of jurisprudence as well as of the Geneva
Uniform Laws that provide a much more elegant solution for the giver of an
aval.
58. Section 56 of the English Act.
59. Gallagher v. Murphy, [1929] S.C.R. 288, [1929] 2 D.L.R. 124, specifically relying
on the proviso to s. 130. The section reads in full as follows: "No person is liable
as drawer, endorser or acceptor of a bill who has not signed it as such, but when a
person signs a bill otherwise than as a drawer or acceptor, he thereby incurs the
liabilities of an endorser to a holder in due course and is subject to all the
provisions of this Act respecting endorsers" [emphasis added]. The emphasized
language does not appear in English s. 56, which otherwise is substantially
similar.
60. Section 54A to the South African Bills of Exchange Act, as added by the S.A.
Amendment Act, supra, footnote 7, at s. 17.
61. However, under s. 144(2), "Where a bill has been materially altered, but the
alteration is not apparent, and the bill is in the hands of a holder in due course,
the holder may avail himself of the bill as if it had not been altered and may
enforce payment of it according to its original tenor." No change is proposed for
this subsection.
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alteration from the coverage of the provision.62 In fact, a materially
altered bill is "split" into two bills, with prior parties remaining liable
according to the original tenor of the bill.
24. New Section 144.1: Bill Taken for Obligation
A new provision is to be added to deal with the relationship
between the bill and the obligation for which it was given (e.g., in
payment for goods or repayment of a loan). It is to state as follows:
(a) The obligation is suspended pro tanto until the bill is either
discharged or dishonoured;
(b) Other than in the case provided in paragraph (c), the obligation is
discharged when the bill is discharged;
(c) When the bill is dishonoured, the holder or person entitled to lawful
possession in his own right may sue either on the bill, in an action
governed by this Act, or on the obligation, under the law governing
the obligation; and
(d) Notwithstanding paragraph (b), when a party liable on the bill is
discharged due to the failure by the holder or the person in lawful
possession in his own right to comply with respect to the bill with any
duty relating to the presentment, sending notice of dishonour or
protest, and subject to deduction for any loss or damages caused by
the failure to comply with any such duty, the holder or the person in
lawful possession in his own right may sue that party on the
obligation, under the law that governs that obligation.
Paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) codify and clarify the
existing law.63 Paragraph 1(d) is designed to clarify the law, correct
an anomaly and eliminate injustice. A contrary "draconian rule" is
indefensible.6
An exception should be made where otherwise agreed, and where
a bank 65 is or becomes liable, other than as an accommodation
party or a giver of an aval, on a bill taken for an obligation of a
person other than the obligated bank. In such a case any other
liability on the bill, and the obligation, is pro tanto discharged. This
exception is designed to cover the case of payment by means of a
62. Byles, supra, footnote I1, at p. 274.
63. See, e.g., In re Charge Card Services Ltd., [ 1988] 3 All E.R. 702, [198812 F.T.L.R.
609 (C.A.), at p. 707.
64. See R.M. Goode, Commercial Law, 2nd ed. (London, Penguin Books, 1995), p.
558.
65. As defined in s. 164, to include "every member of the Canadian Payments
Association established under the Canadian Payments Act and every local
cooperative credit society, as defined in that Act, that is a member of a central, as
defined in that Act, that is a member of the Canadian Payments Association."
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bank draft or certified cheque, in which case, typically, the remitter
already paid the issuing bank and it is unjust to hold him
responsible for the subsequent default of the banker, on whom the
payee was prepared to rely. This follows the ucc's approach66 and
reflects the better view under existing law.
25. Amendment to Section 155(1): Lost Bill
Section 155(1) provides that "Where a bill has been lost before it is
overdue, the person who was the holder of it may apply to the drawer
to give him another bill of the same tenor, giving security to the
drawer, if required, to indemnify him against all persons whatever,
in case the bill alleged to have been lost is found again."
An amendment is required to enhance the ex-holder's right and
allow him to obtain (against security) signatures other than that of
the drawer. In fact, what is proposed is consistent with present s. 156,
which does not discharge those other parties from their liability. As
well, following a similar amendment in South Africa,6 7 the provision
ought to be amended to cover "destroyed" bills and not only lost
bills.
For the purpose of s. 155(1), and in fact, whenever the drawer is
treated as the issuer of the bill, the maker of a note shall be deemed to
correspond to the drawer of a bill. This is an exception to the general
rule, provided in s. 186(2), under which the maker of a note is usually
analogized to the acceptor of a bill.
26. New Section 156.1: Conversion and
Money Had and Received
A provision should be added stating that, where applicable, and
subject to the provisions of the Act, the actions of conversion and
money had and received under the common law 68 are available to a
dispossessed holder of a bill or any other person entitled to lawful
possession of it.
In English law, as against-anyone who took an instrument after
the theft or loss of an instrument payable to order, the actions of
conversion and money had and received are fundamental to the
enforcement of the rights of the true owner of a bill who has been
66. ucc, § 3-310(a).
67. Section 67 to the South African Bills of Exchange Act, as added by the S.A.
Amendment Act, supra, footnote 7, at s. 24.
68. Section 9 says these actions will apply, "save in so far as they are inconsistent
with the express provisions of this Act."
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dispossessed. 69 There is no comparable remedy in civil law which
may lead to inconsistency in the allocation of forged endorsement
losses between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Briefly stated, under
Quebec law, the liability of former wrongful possessors is based on
fault 70 and is not absolute as it is in the common law tort of
conversion.
27. Revision of Sections 163.1 to 163.4:
Alternative Modes of Presentment
In 2007, the Act was amended to accommodate electronic
presentment of bills 7 as will be authorized under the Canadian
Payments Act.72 In my view, this does not go far enough; rather, a
broader authorization for alternative modes of presentment, other
than by the exhibition of the instrument at the drawee branch, 73 is
needed. For example, an alternative mode of presentment should be
permitted per interbank agreements in data centres as well as in
clearing facilities. Also, procedures ought to be made to
accommodate both the technical failure of the electronic
presentment and the dishonour of the cheque electronically
presented, such as for the return of an image return document.
28. First New Paragraph to Section 165: Post-Dated Cheques
A provision should be added stating that a cheque is payable on
demand as of the date written on it as the date of issue. This is
designed to give full effect to the practice of cheque post-dating. A
cheque is required under s. 165(1) to be payable on demand; hence,
questions arise as to whether a post-dated cheque is a cheque at all
and whether it is payable prior to the date it bears as the date of its
ostensible issue. The proposed new provision gives effect to the
69. See, e.g., Geva, Bank Collections and Payment Transactions (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2001), pp. 440-444.
70. See Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society v. Banque Canadienne Nationale, [ 1934]
4 D.L.R. 223, [1934] S.C.R. 596, and discussion in Geva, supra, footnote 69, at
pp. 456-459.
71. An Act to amend the law governing financial institutions and to provide for
related and consequential matters, S.C. 2007, c. 6.
72. Canadian Payments Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-21. For now, the electronic
presentment provisions of the Act (ss. 163.1 to 163.4) are inoperative. In October
2008, the CPA board decided not to proceed any further with the image-based
clearing initiative. See <http://www.cdnpay.ca/news/boarddecision-re tec-
p.asp>.
73. As required for presentment for payment under ss. 84(3) and 87(b).
74. See, e.g., M.L.J. Rajanayagam, "The Post-Dated Cheque and Holding in Due
Course" (1969), J. Bus. L. 33.
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view that appears to prevail 75 in Canada7 6 and is designed to settle
these controversies by legitimizing the instrument as a cheque
payable as of the date it bears.
29. Second New Paragraph to Section 165:
Cheque Certification
"Certification" is not addressed by the Act. It is the marking of a
cheque by the drawee bank to show that (1) the cheque is drawn by
the person purporting to draw it, (2) it is drawn on an existing
account with the drawee and (3) there are sufficient funds to meet it.
By reference to an article of mine,7 7 case law in Canada
conceptualized the drawee bank's liability on certification as that
of an acceptor. 78 Crawford challenges this conceptualization but
does not question the certifying bank's liability; 79 nor does he claim
that the imposition of absolute liability on the certifying bank8o is a
necessary derivation from the acceptance rationale,8 1 a point on
which I elaborated elsewhere. 82 Regardless, liability on certification
ought better to be set out specifically by statute.
30. Third New Paragraph to Section 165:
Non-Transferable Cheque
A drawer of a cheque may insist on the use of the instrument
strictly for a non-cash payment to the payee so as to preclude its
negotiation or even transfer. It is thus proposed that a provision be
added stating that a cheque manifesting an intention that it will not
be transferred shall not be transferable, but shall only be valid as
between the parties thereto. 83 Such a cheque may, however, be
75. Crawford is, however, more equivocal: supra, footnote 3, vol. 3 at § 34:50.20(5).
76. Keyes v. Royal Bank of Canada, 11947] S.C.R. 377, [1947] 3 D.L.R. 161; and
Shapiro v. Greenstein (1969), 10 D.L.R. (3d) 746 (Que. C.A.).
77. B. Geva, "Irrevocability of Bank Drafts, Certified Cheques and Money Orders"
(1986), 65 Can. Bar Rev. 107, at p. 129.
78. See Maubach v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 134, 60 O.R. (2d)
189 (H.C.J.), affd 44 D.L.R. (4th) 575, 62 O.R. (2d) 220 (C.A.).
79. Crawford, supra, footnote 3, vol. 3, at § 34:70.60.
80. As appears to be the law under A.E. LePage Real Estate Services Ltd. v. Rattray
Publications (1994), 120 D.L.R. (4th) 499, 21 O.R. (3d) 164 (C.A.).
81. Crawford, supra, footnote 3, vol. 3, at § 34:70.60(3)(b)(v).
82. B. Geva, "The Autonomy of the Banker's Obligation on Bank Drafts and
Certified Cheques" (1994), 73 Can. Bar Rev. 21. The view rejecting the absolute
liability is confirmed by Esses v. Friedberg & Co., 2008 ONCA 646, 241 O.A.C. 134,
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2009] I S.C.R. viii, 395 N.R. 393n. See Geva,
supra, footnote 40.
83. Such language may use the terms such as "non-negotiable" or "non-transferable"
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delivered to an agent, including a bank, for collection. This is
broader than s. 20(1) covering the non-transferable bill 84 as well as
that of s. 174 dealing with "Not Negotiable" cross.85
31. Amendment to Section 165(3): Cheque for Deposit
Section 165(3) currently provides that "Where a cheque is
delivered to a bank for deposit to the credit of a person and the
bank credits him with the amount of the cheque, the bank acquires
all the rights and powers of a holder in due course of the cheque."
The provision has been criticized as going too far86 in allowing a
collecting bank to become a holder in due course under a relaxed
taking for value requirement8 7 and possibly even without fulfilling
other requirements such as the taking in good faith and without
notice requirements." I propose to replace the provision with a new
provision stating that a bank which takes for value, or has a lien on, a
cheque payable to order which the holder delivers to it for collection,
has such (if any) rights, as it would have had if, upon delivery, the
holder had indorsed it in blank.8 9 Per proposed amendments to s.
52(1), discussed in item 14 above, "taking for value" will not be
satisfied by merely crediting the account; actual withdrawal of
credited funds will usually be required.
or be drafted to be payable to payee only, with or without the printed "order"
next to it.
84. The provision states that "[w]hen a bill contains words prohibiting transfer, or
indicating an intention that it should not be transferable, it is valid as between the
parties thereto, but it is not negotiable." It is not settled what language is
sufficient. See, e.g., Hibernian Bank v. Gysin, [1939] 1 K.B. 483, [19391 1 All E.R.
166 (C.A.). It has been held that the provision does not preclude transferability
under general law. See ibid. and Chandler v. Edmonton Portland Cement Co. Ltd.,
[1917] 1 W.W.R. 1408, 33 D.L.R. 302 (Alta. S.C., A.D.).
85. The provision states that "[w]here a person takes a crossed cheque that bears on it
the words 'not negotiable', he does not have and is not capable of giving a better
title to the cheque than the person from whom he took it had." The provision
does not preclude transfer even by negotiation. It ought to be repealed anyway.
See, supra, recommendation 5 in the section of this paper entitled "1. Outright
Deletions with No Replacements."
86. See S. Scott, "The Bank is Always Right: Section 165(3) of the Bills of Exchange
Act and Its Curious Parliamentary History" (1973), 19 McGill L.J. 78.
87. For the taking for value requirement under this proposal, see, supra, item 14,
"Amendment to Section 52(1): Taking for Value."
88. So far, case law has not dispensed with the taking in good faith and without
notice requirements. See, e.g., Royal Bank of Canada v. Ryan (1993), 107 Nfld. &
P.E.I.R. 1, 39 A.C.W.S. (3d) t094 (Nfld. S.C.), at paras. 89-91.
89. The proposed new provision follows s. 2 to the English Cheques Act, 1957.
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32. Amendment to Section 167: Authority to Pay
Present s. 167 deals with the revocation of banker's authority
upon countermand of payment and notice of customer's death. An
amendment should add similar events, such as notice of adjudication
of incapacity, or declaration of bankruptcy, winding up or otherwise
placement under judicial management, as having the same effect.
33. New Section 167.1: Payment of Cheque
The Act does not provide when a cheque is paid. Elsewhere I have
argued that the time of payment could be derived from clearing rules
and bank practices, particularly by reference to the failure of a
drawee bank to timely return a dishonoured cheque.90 Crawford
"respectfully disagree[s]" with my analysis.9 ' For greater legal
certainty, the point ought to be specifically provided for by statute,
following in the footsteps of ucc, art. 4.92
34. New Section 184.1: "Visa"
The Act provides for a note payable after sight but does not
provide for a mechanism for ascertaining the point from which time
of maturity becomes visible on such an instrument. For a bill,
presentment for "acceptance," to be responded to by a signature on
the bill, provides for such a mechanism. Unlike the drawee of a bill,
the maker of a note is liable on it anyway so no presentment for
acceptance is available (or indeed needed). Borrowing the solution in
art. 78 of the Geneva Uniform Laws, the proposed new provision
should state, in the language of the aforesaid art. 78, that, where a
note is payable after sight, presentment for "the visa of the maker" is
necessary in order to fix the maturity of the instrument. Maturity
will run as of that presentment, as acknowledged by the maker's
signature on the note. The provisions applicable to the presentment
of a bill for acceptance will apply with the necessary modifications to
the presentment of a note for visa. The refusal of the maker to give
his visa with the date thereon is a dishonour of the note.
90. B. Geva, "Presentment and Payment in Cheque Electronic Clearing: Advance
Bank V. TD Bank" (2005), 20 B.F.L.R. 361.
91. Crawford, supra, footnote 3, vol. I at § 1:20.50.
92. See ucc, § 4-215(a) and related provisions, discussed in B. Geva, "Payment
Finality and Discharge in Funds Transfers" (2008), 83 Chicago-Kent L. Rev.
633, at pp. 639-643.
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35. Amendments to Part V
Part V (ss. 188 to 192) was added in 1970 and deals with consumer
bills and notes.9 3 It permits a consumer to resist an action brought by
a sales financer by raising defences available against the seller. It
covers negotiable instruments issued to (i) vendors of goods or
services and negotiated to a financer as well as to (ii) some lenders,
who lent money used to buy the goods or services. To trigger the
availability of defences, such instruments are required by s. 190(1) to
"be prominently and legibly marked." However, the provisions are
not tightly drafted and embarrassing errors and loopholes have
surfaced. It is proposed to revise Part V with a view to correcting
errors and filling in gaps as follows:
1. Its provisions could be extended to small businesses and
farmers and not necessarily be restricted to consumers;
2. The term "consumer purchase" is defined in s. 188 to
exclude "cash purchase." This appears to exclude sales
where the outstanding balance of the purchase price is fully
paid for from the proceeds of a loan at the time of the sale
so that no credit has been extended by the seller so that the
transaction is a "cash purchase"; 95
3. Under s. 189(3)(b), an instrument issued to a lender is issued
in respect of a consumer purchase where:
(a) the consideration for its issue was the lending or advancing of
money or other valuable security by a person other than the
seller, in order to enable the purchaser to make the consumer
purchase; and
(b) the seller and the person who lent or advanced the money or
other valuable security were, at the time the bill or note was
issued, not dealing with each other at arm's length within the
meaning of the Income Tax Act. [Emphasis added.]
The emphasized language has proved to be too narrow to capture
a lender closely related to the vendor as intended by Parliament. 96
4. Section 190(2) provides that, in principle, an unmarked
consumer bill or note is void. This raises questions as to
whether the holder can sue the consumer on the underlying
transaction. There is no reason to deprive the holder from
93. An Act to amend the Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 4 (1st Supp).
94. For a detailed discussion, see Geva, supra, footnote 46, at pp. 197-230.
95. See e.g., Royal Bank of Canada v. Siemens (1978), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 527 (B.C. Co.
Ct.).
96. See, e.g., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Lively (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d)
432, 19 N.S.R. (2d) 400 (S.C.).
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this action, which could be met by defences available to the
consumer on the underlying transaction. To that end, it is
better to say that an unmarked instrument is unenforceable
(rather than void), and to clarify that the action on the
underlying transaction is available to the holder;
5. To prevent easy avoidance, it ought to be provided in s. 190(2)
that a consumer may assert his defences arising from the sale
against a lender whose note is governed or would have been
governed by Part V and who is suing on the loan; and
6. At present, s. 191 subjects the holder of a marked consumer
bill or consumer note to "any defence or right of set-off,
other than counter-claim, that the purchaser would have
had in an action by the seller on the consumer bill or
consumer note" [emphasis added]. The emphasized language
is a source of confusion and should be eliminated. There is
no seller's action on the bill or note when the instrument is
issued to the lender. Also, unless a new paragraph is added
to s. 73 as proposed in item 19 above, the present language
protects the holder from the defence of a failure of
consideration in an unascertained amount. Finally, the
phrase "set-off, other than counter-claim" requires clarifi-
cation; 97 arguably, it refers to statutory and not equitable
set-off and precludes an affirmative liability. 98
III. CONCLUDING REMARK
As electronic funds transfers have come to supersede cheques, it is
only natural that a discussion on meaningful reforms in the law
governing payment systems and electronic funds transfers will
eclipse a discussion of basic law reform in the area of paper-based
systems. However, for the foreseeable future, paper credit and
payment instruments will continue to play a significant role in
facilitating economic activity. Legal certainty requires the
improvement of the law that governs these instruments. I hope
that the detailed proposals set out above will lead to a constructive
and useful discussion.
97. With respect to instruments given for patent rights, s. 14 (sought to be repealed;
see point I in item I above) is clearer; it states that "[t]he endorsee or other
transferee of any instrument . . . having the words 'Given for a patent right'
printed or written thereon takes the instrument subject to any defence or set-off in
respect of the whole or any part thereof that would have existed between the
original parties." [Emphasis added].
98. See Geva, supra, footnote 46, at pp. 225-227.
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